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  In recognition of the fact that the competition among telecommunications platforms that 
demands deregulation is not ubiquitously effective, I endorse and expatiate on the objective 
“bright line” test proposed by the Canadian company TELUS for determining when and within 
what geographic market boundaries to deregulate.   
  In accordance with that test, I then discuss the nature of the antitrust policy upon which 
falls responsibility for preserving the competition that is the logical surrogate for direct 
regulation.  Following the rule of reason prescribed by the United States Supreme Court 95 years 
ago, I would have that policy concentrate on the behavior of the incumbent access providers and 
the intent that may logically be inferred from it.   
  Finally, applying the two preceding expositions to the highly politically charged, largely 
ideological demands for a legislatively imposed rule of “network neutrality,” I contend that if the 
two previously recommended policies are followed, such a legislative mandate would be both 
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It has become increasingly clear in recent years that whether or not 
to proceed with the deregulation of telecommunications is or should no 
longer be an active issue.  For the majority of subscribers, service is no 
longer a natural monopoly because the competition among diverse plat-
forms is sufficiently ubiquitous for us to envision deregulated competi-
tion as the general rule and continued regulation the exception.  By the 
same token, we need a basis for deciding when and where that process 
has advanced sufficiently to justify deregulation: in Part I, I propose a 
comparatively simple, objective criterion. 
In Part II, I discuss how to give substance to the role of the antitrust 
laws, to which in principle falls the responsibility for protecting and pre-
serving the competition that makes deregulation feasible.  (In view of the 
mammoth mergers in the industry during the last several years—
including mergers across platforms—it is worth underscoring that that 
responsibility precedes as well as succeeds deregulation, both logically 
and chronologically.  In a very real sense the different technologies em-
bodied in different platforms may be said to compete with one another in 
a way that is real and highly beneficial.  But to the extent that “competi-
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tion” takes place only within the firm, it is merely metaphorical; it is not 
a sufficient substitute for competition between or among firms, as an au-
thentic basis for deregulation.) 
Finally, in Part III, I apply these considerations to the increasingly 
politicized and emotional issue of “network neutrality,” cutting through 
the reasoning-by-metaphor and sloganeering to disclose that the logical 
core of these arguments consists in part—but only in part—in differing 
responses to the issues I discuss in Parts I and II.  The other part is, for 
want of a better term, ideological—which probably explains the increas-
ing shrillness of the debate: while talking the language of competition 
and monopoly, regulation and deregulation, its proponents and proposals 
go beyond the limits of what constitutes an effectively functioning com-
petitive, market economy—which is not to say that they are for this rea-
son illegitimate.  To these views, I attempt to offer a bridge—or, for what 
it may be worth, a partial bridge—consistent with my views of the 
proper role of government in a competitive, market economy. 
I.  THE CASE AND TRIPPING POINT FOR DEREGULATION 
According to the FCC,
1 19 percent of all switched subscriber access 
lines in mid 2005 were served by competitive local exchange carriers 
(CLECs).  Cable companies represent a prominent and a rapidly increas-
ing share of these: although they have only begun offering telephony on 
a large scale, they already account for about 4 percent of all residential 
lines.  In addition, more subscribers actually have cell phones than tradi-
tional landline telephone service: that ratio will almost certainly increase 
as we octogenarians and nonagenarians pass from the scene.  These na-
tional data hardly suggest instantaneous and ubiquitous deregulation;
2 
  1.  Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30, 2005, Report, 2006 WL 927328 
(Apr. 2006). 
  2.  For example, according to the same FCC survey, the CLECs’ share of all switched 
subscriber access lines ranges between 6 to 8 percent, in Hawaii and Montana, and 40 percent 
in Rhode Island; their share of residential between 0 to 4 percent in Hawaii, Montana, Nevada, 
and West Virginia and 32.6 percent in Rhode Island; and their share of business lines, between 
12 to 18 percent in Wyoming, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Hawaii, Indiana, and Idaho and 
40 to 60 percent in the New England states, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware and the Dis-
trict of Columbia.  Id. at 11. 
Vinton Cerf, Vice President & “Chief Internet Evangelist” of Google, Inc., has asserted 
that as of 2004 only 53 percent of Americans had a choice between cable modem and DSL 
service and those two provided 99.5 percent of all broadband service to consumers.  Reconsid-
ering Our Communications Laws: Ensuring Competition and Innovation: Hearing Before the 
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (June 14, 2006) (statement of Vinton G. Cerf, Vice 
President & Chief Internet Evangelist, Google Inc) [hereinafter Cerf].  The 53 percent figure 
seems, however, to substantially underestimate the actual or directly potential facilities-based 
competition.  For example, the FCC’s latest broadband report, High-Speed Services for Inter-
net Access: Status as of June 30, 2005, Report, 2006 WL 927327, at *3 (Apr. 2006), states that 
as of June 2005, cable modem service was available to 91 percent of households to whom ca-012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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but they also fail dismally to reflect how dramatic the turnaround and 
dissolution of the local landline-based telephone monopolies have been.  
In December 1999, incumbent local telephone companies served 181.3 
million land lines; by June 2005, that number had declined to 144.1 mil-
lion;
3 in the first quarter of 2006, it was dropping by 150,000 a week—
7,500,000 a year.
4
Newspaper reports capture these dramatic changes more quickly—
and breathlessly—than official annual statistics: 
In 2005, the number of subscribers to Internet-based calling services 
nearly tripled from the year before, to 5.5 million . . . By 2010 [esti-
mates are that] Internet phone providers [will have won] about a 
quarter of the traditional local phone business  .  .  . 
 
In New York, Verizon recently sent letters to customers offering a 
calling plan that includes unlimited phone service for $35 a month, 
instead of $60 . . . For people signing up for service through its web 
site, AT&T now offers unlimited local and long distance service for 
$40, down from $50 a year ago.
5
These numbers signal a dramatic change, already in process, that calls 
for a radical reconsideration of our inherited regulatory institutions, at 
once in some places and soon in others. 
In 2005, the Canadian incumbent local exchange carrier (ILEC), 
TELUS,  proposed to its regulators (the Canadian Radio-television and 
Telecommunications Commission—CRTC) an objective “bright-line” 
test, satisfaction of which would automatically call for regulatory for-
bearance: whenever and wherever a second, facilities-based carrier has 
taken over some specified percentage of the subscriber access lines of an 
incumbent telephone company, in a market geographically defined by the 
reach of the facilities of the (presumably cable) competitor.
6
In TELUS’ proposal, the “bright-line” was 5 percent—a figure that 
would at first glance seem absurdly low, as the CRTC indeed ultimately 
decided:
 7 one would not ordinarily expect a market 95 percent of which 
ble TV service was available and DSL was available to 76 percent of households served by 
ILECs.  Since both ILEC and cable TV are nearly ubiquitous, this would suggest that house-
holds with a choice would be somewhere in the 70 percent range. 
  3.  Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30, 2005, supra note 1, at 4. 
  4.  Matt Richtel & Ken Belson, Online Calling Heralds an Era of Lower Costs, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 3, 2006, at A11. 
  5. Id. 
  6.  Comments of TELUS Communications Inc., in Forbearance from Regulation of Lo-
cal Exchange Services, Telecom Public Notice CRTC 2005-2, 28 April 2005 (Public Notice 
2005-2). 
  7.  Expressing the opinion that “it is the loss of customers to competitors by an applicant 
ILEC which best demonstrates that . . . [its] market power may be diminished,” the CRTC de-012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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is served by a single incumbent to be effectively competitive.  Justifying 
so small a “bright-line,” however, were the following considerations: 
 
A.  the achievement of a 5 percent share of a market so long 
served entirely by incumbent telephone companies would be 
clearly reflective of a major competitive effort; 
B.  the process would be just beginning; 
C.  its perpetuation and expansion within the market already 
reached by their facilities would be ensured by the very large 
sunk investments and consequent low marginal costs
8 of both 
parties in that region.
9   
 
In supporting testimony, I recommended adding the requirement of a 
third, competitive platform independent of the ILECs, presumably wire-
less, the presence of which was implicit in the TELUS proposal.  This 
calls attention once more to the need for a careful assessment of wide-
spread mergers in recent years, both among wireless companies and be-
tween them and local telephone companies.
10  In these circumstances, it 
creed, conservatively, that the applicant ILEC would have to demonstrate a loss of 25 percent 
of the market to be accorded regulatory forbearance.  Forbearance from the Regulation of Re-
tail Local Exchange Services, Telecom Decision CRTC 2006-15, 6 April 2006 ¶¶246 (Tele-
com Decision 2006-15). 
  8.  As I learned first from John Maurice Clark, the high ratio of fixed to variable costs of 
both competitors tends further to hold down the profit-maximizing level of their charges by 
increasing the “margin” elasticity of demand for their respective services: the lower volume of 
sales associated with higher prices being only slightly offset in their effect on profits by sav-
ings in variable costs, the greater volumes associated with lower prices only slightly offset or 
discouraged by higher variable costs biases the choice in the direction of the latter.  JOHN 
MAURICE CLARK, COMPETITION 148-50 (1961); see also Jerry A. Hausman, Regulated Costs 
and Prices in Telecommunications,  in I NTERNATIONAL  HANDBOOK OF 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS  ECONOMICS, VOLUME  2: EMERGING  TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
NETWORKS 226 (Gary Madded ed., 2003); From 2-G to 3-G: Wireless Competition for Inter-
net-Related Services, in B ROADBAND:  SHOULD  WE  REGULATE  HIGH-SPEED  INTERNET 
ACCESS, 126-27 (Robert W. Crandall & James H. Alleman eds., AEI-Brookings Joint Center 
for Regulatory Studies, 2002); Dennis L. Weisman, When Can Regulation Defer to Competi-
tion For Constraining Market Power?: Complements and Critical Elasticities, 2 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 101 (2006). 
  9.  For essentially this reason, Bell Canada, another participant, argued that “if it were 
proposing a market share test for the purposes of measuring market power, measuring shares 
on the basis of capacity the ability to provide service, would be more relevant . . . .”  Forbear-
ance from the Regulation of Retail Local Exchange Services, supra note 7, at ¶ 174 (emphasis 
supplied). 
  10. See AT&T and BellSouth Merger: What Does It Mean for Consumers? Before the 
Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Jonathan L. Rubin, Senior Research Fellow, Ameri-
can Antitrust Institute) [hereinafter Rubin]; see also Robert W. Crandall & Clifford Winston, 
The Breakdown of ‘Breakup,’ WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2006, at A14 (generally dismissing any 
concerns about the AT&T/BellSouth merger).  Partly contributing to the complacency of the 
latter two may have been the fact that that merger does not in itself involve any repression of 012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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seems to me important to assess the competition of non-affiliated provid-
ers of wireless services—including municipalities—and, as Jonathan 
Rubin, Robert Hahn and Scott Wallsten emphasize, freeing up the spec-
trum for others, service providers and users.
11
Such an objective test would have many advantages.  It would seem 
to be easily administrable: the geographic scope of the market, the defini-
tion of the services, and the tipping point market share achieved by chal-
lengers would all be determined by observation, the first two by the over-
lapping reach of the facilities of both competitors in which effectively 
competitive behavior already prevails and, because of the large sunk in-
vestments required, is highly likely to persevere; and the last by a count 
of subscriber lines.  And it would avoid the full-fledged adversarial ex-
pert testimonies openly invited by strictly “economic” tests, such as the 
U.S. Horizontal Merger Guidelines—calling for attestations of economic 
expert witnesses to the presence of market power sufficient to “impose at 
least a ‘small but significant and nontransitory’ increase in price” as the 
basis for geographic and product market definitions.
12
wireless as a third competitor, since the two merging companies were already co-owners of 
Cingular. On the other hand, the apparent intention of two major cable companies, Comcast 
and Cox, to set up some sort of joint venture with Sprint Nextel, the largest remaining unaffili-
ated wireless provider, raises once again the specter, which Crandall and Winston do not con-
sider, of three competing platforms reducing to two in the areas in which they overlap.  See 
Ken Belson, Cable Companies, Taking Aim at the Bells, Bulk Up in Wireless Phone Services, 
N.Y.TIMES, Apr. 10, 2006, at C4. 
How that last plan will relate to Sprint Nextel’s exciting later announcement of a joint 
venture with Intel to spend up to three billion dollars over a two year period constructing a 
mobile WiMax network remains to be seen, John Markoff & Ken Belson, Sprint Will Build an 
Intel-Backed Network, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2006, at C7; but it reminds us once again of both 
the dynamic competitive potential of telecom technology—see the optimistic interpretation of 
the Wall Street Journal and the Progress and Freedom Foundation, in the latter’s blog of Au-
gust 9, 2006—and the importance of keeping that competition inter- rather than merely intra-
firm. 
Crandall and Winston’s lone argument is that this last step in the re-integration of the 
“long-distance” and local business of the Bells demonstrates the futility of the original dissolu-
tion of AT&T—a contention with which I agree. That proposition, however, in no way mini-
mizes, nor could it, the enormous benefits to the public from the dissolution of the AT&T fran-
chised monopoly, originally protected from competition in all aspects of its business, from 
consumer premises equipment to “vertical services” and long distance—a dissolution reaching 
back some quarter of a century before dissolution of the Company itself under the Consent 
Decree in the antitrust case. 
  11. See Rubin, supra note 10; Robert W. Hahn & Scott Wallsten, The Economics of Net 
Neutrality, 3 ECONOMISTS’ VOICE 8 (2006), http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol3/iss6/art8/.  For a 
sobering contention of the limitations of wireless as a competitor of land-line Internet service, 
because of the limitation of its capacity and the consequent necessity of those carriers either 
limiting subscriber usage or charging very high rates—something like $80 a month for unlim-
ited data downloads, see Amol Sharma & Dionne Searcey, Cell Carriers to Web Customers: 
Use Us, but Not Too Much, WALL ST. J., May 11, 2006, at B1. 
  12. U.S.  DEPT. OF JUSTICE AND FED.  TRADE  COMM’N,  HORIZONTAL  MERGER 
GUIDELINES 4 (April 2, 1992).  See also infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text. 012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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In my testimony, I observed the coincidence of the TELUS proposal 
with my own consistently expressed preference for an interpretation of 
the antitrust laws as prohibiting anti-competitive behavior and the intent 
that can reasonably be inferred from it, as opposed to economic evalua-
tions of either the structure of the markets involved or of their economic 
performance or results.
13  In the present context, the only “performance” 
called for would be active competitive behavior, reflected in substantial 
market penetration by rivals.  The pertinent geographic market would be 
defined, objectively, by the overlapping reach of the existing facilities of 
the two competitors, and the only relevant results would be the achieve-
ment by the challenger of a stipulated minimum share of subscriber 
lines.
14
I find it impossible to read the 535-paragraph CRTC decision—
which is on the critical subject of when, where, and under what protec-
tive conditions to deregulate—without comparing it with the course of 
airline deregulation and also without considerable introspection: Even 
though in that earlier case we trod the path from “regulatory reform” to 
complete deregulation over a period of eighteen months, without instruc-
tion from Congress,
15 why am I uncertain that I would have written a de-
cision different from that of the CRTC in this case—carefully balancing 
representations by incumbent companies, competitors and interveners, 
splitting differences, reaching “reasonable”—yet also clearly conserva-
tive—resolutions? 
One answer is that airline regulation was government cartelization, 
plain and simple: the only sensible reform, it rather quickly became evi-
dent, was disassembly and abandonment.  The regime of telecommunica-
tions regulation, in contrast, has been much more directly aimed at the 
protection of captive customers from putatively natural monopolies; and, 
correspondingly, the introduction of competition has necessarily required 
regulatory intervention to ensure competitors access to putatively essen-
  13. See generally Alfred E. Kahn, Standards for Antitrust Policy, 67 HARV. L. REV. 28 
(1953); see also discussion infra Part II; see also infra note 48 and accompanying text.  For an 
extended, congenial exposition, see Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 657 (2001). 
  14. Alfred E. Kahn, Appendix 3 to Comments of TELUS Communications Inc., in PN 
2005-2:  Economic Justification for TELUS’ Two-Facilities Bright-Line Forbearance Test, 
June 22, 2005, at 23-31, available at http://nera.com/image/TELUS_JUNE2005.pdf.  In a 
painfully detailed discussion, the CRTC rejected TELUS’ proposed market definition and 
raised its proposed tripping point for forbearance from 5 to 25 percent.  The proffered reasons 
for the first of these were largely administrative—including the availability of the requisite 
information.  See Forbearance from the Regulation of Retail Local Exchange Services, supra 
note 7, at ¶¶ 24-168. 
  15. See Alfred E. Kahn, Deregulation of Air Transportation-Getting from Here to There, 
in REGULATING BUSINESS: THE SEARCH FOR AN OPTIMUM 37 (Chris Argyris ed., 1978); Al-
fred E. Kahn, Applications of Economics to an Imperfect World, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 5-15 
(1979). 012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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tial facilities: simple deregulation has seemed neither feasible nor pru-
dent. 
If there is any sector of the economy most fully characterized by 
dynamic, technological Schumpeterian competition, however, it is this 
one. Technological innovation is, surely, the most powerful and produc-
tive kind of competition and underminer of thoroughgoing economic 
regulation.  Wherever and whenever it prevails, it demands deregulation, 
no less sweeping than decartelization of transportation. 
II.  THE EXPANDED ROLE OF ANTITRUST 
It is a truism—proclaimed by The Digital Age Communications Act 
(DACA) Project and reflected in the DeMint bill
16—that the abandon-
ment of direct economic regulation shifts to the antitrust laws responsi-
bility for protecting consumers.  That truism leaves indeterminate the lo-
cus of responsibility for administering those injunctions: should it be 
state or federal regulatory agencies, or the antitrust enforcement agen-
cies, and if both, with what division of responsibilities and subject to 
what substantive interpretations of the laws? 
The June 2005 DACA Proposal of the Regulatory Framework 
Group recommends an “FTC Act model”—emphasizing the Act’s Sec-
tion 5 prohibition of unfair methods of competition and entrusting en-
forcement to an administrative agency, armed with the power to order 
interconnection of public communications facilities in situations in which 
denials “pose a substantial and non-transitory risk to consumer wel-
fare . . . .”
17  Authority over mergers would be vested exclusively in the 
antitrust agencies in deference to their superior expertise, a recommenda-
tion likely inspired in part by the FCC’s objectionable extension of its 
own vague “public interest” authority in the SWB/Ameritech and Veri-
zon/GTE mergers to exact all sorts of extraneous “public interest” re-
quirements.
18
  16. Digital Age Communications Act of 2005, S. 2113, 109th Cong. (2005). 
  17. PROGRESS  &  FREEDOM  FOUND.,  PROPOSAL OF THE REGULATORY  FRAMEWORK 
WORKING  GROUP  RELEASE 1.0, 25 (2005), http://www.pff.org/issues-
pubs/other/050617regframework.pdf.  The entire discussion of interconnection authority 
makes clear that the recommendation reflects a compromise between an anxiety on the part of 
some members that the imposition of any such requirement might dilute investment incentives 
and an apparently stronger concern about the possible denial of interconnection as an impedi-
ment to competition. 
  18. See Alfred E. Kahn, An Illustration of the Comparative Propensities of the Antitrust 
Agencies and a Regulatory Agency to Meddle, in WHOM THE GODS WOULD DESTROY, OR 
HOW NOT TO DEREGULATE 39-45 (2001) (citing the dissents of Chairman Michael Powell and 
Commissioner Harold Furchtgott-Roth), available at http://www.aei-
brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=112.  The FCC similarly attached certain “vol-
untary” commitments to its approval of the SBC/AT&T and Verizon/MCI mergers. SBC 
Comm. Inc. and AT&T Corp., Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, Memoran-012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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I find these recommendations highly congenial.  The central sub-
stantive emphasis on “unfair methods of competition” accords exactly 
with the intention of the title Joel Dirlam and I gave to our book on anti-
trust policy fifty-plus years ago.
19  It also accords with the clear intention 
of the Sherman Act itself.
20  Lodging enforcement of that injunction in 
the FCC responds directly (though unconsciously) to my expression of 
dismay at the prospect raised by Trinko of the re-litigation before juries 
of endless administrative proceedings during the previous seven years 
under Sections 251 and 271 of the Telecommunications Act, in which the 
CLECs and would-be CLECs exercised their right to complain to the 
Commission of asserted acts of noncompliance.
21
That reaction was, however, in the context of continuing direct 
regulation rather than deregulation; and it did not take into account the 
far larger penalties and, presumably, deterrent effects on ILEC obstruc-
tionism provided by the treble damages remedy in the Sherman Act than 
dum Opinion & Order, 20 FCC Rcd. 18,290, app. F (2005); Verizon Comm. Inc. and MCI, 
Inc., Applications for Approval of Transfer of Control, Memorandum Opinion & Order, 20 
FCC Rcd. 18,433, app. G (2005).  I understand that some state public utility commissions have 
emulated the FCC’s practice with respect to mergers involving subsidiaries subject to their 
jurisdiction. 
  19. See generally JOEL B. DIRLAM & ALFRED E. KAHN, FAIR COMPETITION: THE LAW 
AND ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST POLICY (1954). 
  20. See H ANS B. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, ORIGINATION OF AN 
AMERICAN TRADITION 226-27 (1955), referring only to the Sherman Act: 
The government’s natural role in the system of free private enterprise was that of a 
patrolman policing the highways of commerce.  It is the duty of the modern patrol-
man to keep the road open for all . . . . [T]his means that occupations were to be 
kept open to all who wished to try their luck . . . and that hindrances to equal oppor-
tunity were to be eliminated . . . 
There can be no doubt that the Congress felt that the ultimate beneficiary . . .  was 
the consumer . . . .  The immediate beneficiary legislators had in mind, however, 
was in all probability the small business . . .  whose opportunities were to be safe-
guarded from the dangers emanating from those recently-evolving elements of busi-
ness . . .  strange, gigantic, ruthless and awe-inspiring. 
This is one reason why it was natural to adopt the old doctrines of the common law, 
doctrines whose meaning had been established largely in cases brought by business 
or professional people dissatisfied with the behavior of competitors. 
Perhaps we are even justified in saying that the Sherman Act is not to be viewed ex-
clusively as an expression of economic policy.  In safeguarding rights of the ‘com-
mon man’ in business ‘equal’ to those of the evolving more ‘ruthless’  .  .  .  the 
Sherman Act embodies what is to be characterized as an eminently ‘social’ purpose. 
  21. ALFRED  E.  KAHN,  LESSONS FROM DEREGULATION:  TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND 
AIRLINES AFTER THE CRUNCH 42 (2004).  My corresponding relief when that CCA Decision 
was overturned by the Supreme Court was thoroughly dissipated by the controlling opinion of 
Justice Scalia, speaking for six Justices (although the decision was unanimous), in which he 
used the occasion to examine and prejudge the result of an antitrust inquiry, in effect dismiss-
ing it with reasoning borrowed from Matsushita.  See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices 
of Curtis V. Trinko LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); see infra text accompanying notes 38 and 40. 012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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were available to the FCC and state commissions.
22
On the other hand, I have deep concern about the intention of the 
Report to define “unfair competition” as 
[P]ractices that present a threat of abuse of significant and non-
transitory market power .  .  . consistent[ly] with the application of 
jurisprudential principles grounded in market-oriented competition 
analysis such as those commonly employed by the Federal Trade 
Commission and the United State Department of Justice in enforc-
ing . . . the antitrust laws . . . .
23
As applied to mergers or FCC-ordered interconnection, this pre-
scription seems unexceptionable.  But as applied to “unfair methods of 
competition”—the exclusion of other service providers from the oppor-
tunity to compete on the basis of the relative attractiveness of their offer-
ings—it seems to suggest an intention to confine its application to ac-
tions that would violate the Sherman Act, rather than as a separate, 
additional occasion for regulatory intervention—suggesting thereby that 
the enactment of the FTC Act, 24 years after the Sherman, was or should 
have been superfluous; and that its prohibitions of “unfair methods of 
competition”—or refusals to interconnect
24—would apply only if a 
“market-oriented competition analysis” demonstrated a “significant and 
non-transitory risk” to consumer welfare—an open invitation to combat 
by opposing economic consultants. 
My own intention would be better conveyed by attaching to “prac-
tices” in the DACA proposal “that present a threat of substantially im-
pairing competition”
25 and stopping there—in keeping with my continu-
ing conviction, to which I have already referred, that competition is most 
usefully conceived of as a process, a kind of behavior, and that the anti-
trust laws were as much intended to preserve fair opportunities for com-
  22. See Roger D. Blair & Christine Piette, The Interface of Antitrust and Regulation: 
Trinko, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 665, 681 n.52 (2005).  ILEC obstructionism was surely intensi-
fied by the FCC’s ill-advised prescription of TELRIC pricing of unbundled network ele-
ments—far below not only the historical or embedded costs, but also the long run incremental 
costs of the incumbents.  Looking to the future, as I will point out below, a resurrection of that 
prescription may still be proposed, when and if, as I recommend, antitrust enforcement in-
volves prominent recourse to the essential facilities doctrine. 
  23. See PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., supra note 17, at 23. 
  24. See discussion supra note 17. 
  25. I had originally qualified this statement by inserting the adjective “efficient” after 
“impairing,” in order to disavow any intention to have the antitrust laws protect less efficient 
competitors from—in economic terms deserved—extinction, but eventually realized how thor-
oughly I agree with the original intention of the antitrust laws (see supra note 20) to protect 
competitors from exclusionary tactics, and my disagreement with the increasing tendency in 
recent years of courts deciding whether the disadvantaged or excluded competitors were or 
were not deserving of survival—specifically, in cases of claimed predation.  See discussion 
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petitors as to forestall demonstrable likelihood of injury to consumers.  
What antitrust should condemn is competitive acts or policies betraying 
an intent either to suppress competition or deprive rivals unfairly of the 
opportunity to compete—the very rule of reason explicitly declared and 
applied in the Supreme Court’s Standard Oil decision in 1911.
26
This distinction is, once again, illuminated by the controversies in 
the middle of the last century over the proper competitive standard, once 
it was widely recognized that neither pure nor perfect competition is ei-
ther achievable or desirable—least of all in the presence of rapidly 
changing technology.  The literature in the industrial organization and 
the antitrust fields at that time—inspired, in important measure, by a 
number of decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that seemed to have been 
guided by the pure competition standard, condemning business size, in-
tegration or monopoly power per se—was replete with efforts to define 
the controlling characteristics of an attainable standard of “workable” or 
“effective” competition.
27  In this quest, some commentators stressed: 
 
A.  the structure of the markets in question—the number of com-
petitors in a relevant market, later defined specifically in terms 
of a gap in the chain of substitutes sufficient to permit a single 
seller to set prices above cost, their relative concentration or 
market shares, the possibilities of competitive entry and the 
like—others; 
B.  the behavior of producers and suppliers, guided by the maxim 
that competition describes observable and meaningful rivalry, 
in ways beneficial to consumers; still others; and 
C.  the economic performance of the markets in question, guided 
by the principle that what is ultimately important and should 
be controlling is the observable economic results—the relation 
of prices to costs, the level and continuity of profits, the level 
of costs over time, product and process innovation.
28 
 
In these continuing controversies, as I have already pointed out, I 
have consistently expressed preference for the criterion of behavior and 
the intent that may reasonably be deduced from it.
29  While in no way 
denying the logic of the proposition that if a market is not structurally 
competitive—i.e., does not contain competitors, either actual or on the 
  26. See infra text accompanying note 47. 
  27. The classic statement was J.M. Clark, Toward a Concept of Workable Competition, 
30 AM. ECON. REV. 241 (1940), reprinted in AM. ECON. ASS’N, READINGS IN THE SOCIAL 
CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 452 (1942). 
  28. See DIRLAM & KAHN, supra note 19, at chs. 1-2. 
  29. See id., and, for an explicit explanation that the inference of intent does not call for an 
exercise in psychoanalysis, Kahn, supra note 13, at 48-54. 012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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very top step to an unlocked door—it is not going to be effectively com-
petitive, I pointed out that concentrated or oligopolistic markets—from 
cigarettes to automobiles (before and after imports became a powerful 
constraining force) to electronics—could show widely diverging kinds of 
performance;
30 and that the  definition of the relevant market would itself 
be subject to controversies over the relevant elasticities of demand and 
supply.  As to the performance test, I have cited the virtual impossibility 
of knowing to what extent an apparently “good” performance was actu-
ally explicable by effective competition or, instead, the inherent potential 
of the industry’s technology and, conversely, the unpredictability of the 
results that effective competition would produce or would have pro-
duced. 
Professor George J. Stigler sagely advised us how to make such as-
sessments: 
To determine whether any industry is workably competitive . . . sim-
ply have a good graduate student write his dissertation on the indus-
try and render a verdict.  It is crucial to this test, of course, that no 
second graduate student be allowed to study the industry.
31
I do not read this sardonic observation as excluding the possibility 
of a rational basis for regulatory forbearance.  On the contrary, it merely 
excludes the necessity for a thoroughgoing economic appraisal of the 
presence or absence of market power posing a “significant and non-
transitory risk to consumer welfare.”  Competition is a process, a kind of 
behavior of participants in a market.  Its results are inherently unknow-
able, unpredictable—hence my consistent response thirty years ago to the 
question, “What is the structure of the airline industry going to look like 
after you have deregulated it?” or, today, in view of the profound finan-
cial difficulties of the major hub-and-spoke carriers and the increasingly 
successful competition of the more or less point-to-point low-cost carri-
ers, “What is the structure of the industry likely to be in, say, five 
  30. See also A.D.H. Kaplan, Big Business in a Competitive Society, FORTUNE, Feb. 1953. 
  31. George J. Stigler et al., Report on Antitrust Policy: Discussion, 46 AM. ECON. REV. 
496, 505 (1956).  Similarly, reflecting my own skepticism of the usefulness of an essentially 
“economic” standard—whether in appraisals of market structure or economic performance, 
such as was sought by some of its economist members—see my comment about chapter VII, 
“Economic Indicia of Competition in Monopoly,” of the Report of the Attorney General’s Na-
tional Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws (of which I was a member): 
The ironic fact is that chapter VII is where it is because that is as close as the law-
yers could with propriety put it to the back door, through which most of them were 
quite prepared to throw it.  Even there, it is thoroughly hedged with statements—
sometimes italicized for good measure—to the effect that any relationship between 
its economic discussions and the law, living or dead, was strictly coincidental.”  Id. 
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years?”: “If the answer to that question were knowable, there would have 
been no reason or need to deregulate.”
32
I do not suggest unqualified disagreement with the DACA Report’s 
recommendation of a demonstrable threat to consumer welfare as the es-
sential basis for regulatory intervention, however difficult and judg-
mental it would be.  As I have already observed, it seems the only possi-
ble standard applicable to mergers, in which the action itself cannot flatly 
be labeled “fair” or “unfair,” “competitive” or “anti-competitive”: the 
judgment has to be whether the consequent change in market structure is 
or is not likely to pose a threat to the competitive process and to consum-
ers.  But it does seem to me that grafting that same standard on Section 5 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act’s simple prohibition of “unfair 
methods of competition” would defeat the valid, independent purpose of 
that Act. 
To be sure, any suggestion that antitrust scrutiny concentrate on 
“unfair” or “exclusionary” methods of competition that deny competitors 
the opportunity to prosper or fail on the basis of their efficiency must 
confront the consideration that such practices may themselves—just as 
mergers, price discriminations, tie-ins
33 and exclusive dealing
34—be ef-
ficient, a form of competition or conducive or promotive of it.  No 
economist who has been involved with the airline industry can fail to 
recognize the essentiality as well as inevitability of price discrimination 
in the ubiquitous presence of fixed and common costs—including possi-
ble rationing of low price options—without necessarily producing mo-
nopoly profits overall, just as J.M. Clark did almost a century ago.
35  No 
  32. Kahn, Applications of Economics to an Imperfect World, supra note 15, at 6: 
Our uncertainty about the outcome of the competitive struggle is no reason to pre-
vent its taking place; the only sensible prescription is to give competitors freedom to 
slough off their artificial handicaps by entering and leaving markets, as they please. 
Moreover, if we cannot predict how these offsetting advantages and handicaps of 
the several carriers are likely to work out under a regime of free entry, it seems to 
me even less likely that we can hope to achieve the most efficient performance of 
the transportation function by prescribing how the thousands of markets should be 
served, as the proponents of the status quo would have us do.  I find it difficult to 
see how these uncertainties tilt the balance in the direction of a reliance on predicta-
bly ignorant regulation in preference to an uncertainly predictable market process. 
  33. Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 
19 (1957). 
  34. I make no effort here to summarize adequately the “University of Chicago” view that 
vertical integrations cannot be anticompetitive and the “post-Chicago” critics of that proposi-
tion.  See, as one example of the latter, Joseph Farrell, Deconstructing Chicago on Exclusive 
Dealing, (Competition Policy Ctr., Working Paper No. CPC05-053, 2005), available at 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPC05-053, and, in particular relation to telecommunica-
tions, Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access 
Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 85 (2003). 
  35. J.M. CLARK, STUDIES IN THE ECONOMICS OF OVERHEAD COSTS (1923).  See also 012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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student of Schumpeter can fail to appreciate the legitimate role of price 
discrimination—or of tie-ins, as a specific form of it—in exploitation of 
the monopoly power (judged by the standard of pure competition) that he 
taught us is an essential part of the innovation process.  The necessity for 
drawing such distinctions is inescapable.
36
But only the economically brainwashed can deny that price dis-
crimination has also been used as a means of predation, to the ultimate 
injury of consumers, however frequent routine allusions to McGee’s 
proffered—and later refuted—demolition of the contentions of the popu-
lists about the tactics used by John D. Rockefeller
37 or the scriptures of 
Matsushita
38 and Brooke Group.
39  More fundamentally, I find myself on 
A.E. Kahn, Deregulation of Air Transportation, supra note 15; Michael E. Levine, Price Dis-
crimination Without Market Power, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (2002); WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, 
REGULATION MISLED BY MISREAD THEORY 29-30 (2006). 
In anticipation of my discussion of the hotly contested current issue related to “network 
neutrality,” in Part III below, it is worth emphasizing here that a very important part of the 
complicated price differentiations that the major air carriers introduced into their fare struc-
tures after deregulation were not discriminatory at all.  The comparative unavailability of 
highly discounted fares at crowded airports and at times of congestion; the greater downward 
taper in per mile fares with greater distance, larger planes and higher load factors—as on vaca-
tion flights—are in major part not discriminatory, but reflect genuine differences in marginal 
(and marginal opportunity) costs thitherto suppressed by regulation.  Alfred E. Kahn, Deregu-
lation: Looking Backward and Looking Forward, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 325, 343-44, 346, 349 
(1990). 
  36. See J ONATHAN  L.  RUBIN,  AM.  ANTITRUST  INST.,  DISCUSSION  PAPER ON THE 
APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 82 OF THE TREATY TO EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES (Mar. 30, 2006), 
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/491.pdf. 
  37. John S. McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1. J.L. & 
ECON. 137 (1958); John S. McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECON. 289 (1980); 
James A. Dalton & Louis Esposito, Predatory Pricing and Standard Oil: A Re-Examination of 
the Trial Record, 20 RES. L. & ECON. 22 (2006); infra note 39. 
  38. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.  v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 U.S. 574, 589-90 (1986). 
[T]here is a consensus among commentators that predatory pricing schemes are 
rarely tried, and even more rarely successful. Id. at 589. 
[M]istaken inferences [and the resulting false condemnations].  .  .are especially 
costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect. 
Id. at 594. 
  39. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).  
Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239 
(2000); Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & Michael T. Mumford, Does predatory pricing exist?  Eco-
nomic theory and the Courts After Brooke Group, 41 ANTITRUST BULL. 949, 982 (1996) (“The 
courts have relied too heavily on the idea that predation is rare and even more rarely success-
ful.  This judgment is supported by neither theory nor fact.  Rather it is supported by some 
rather ad hoc theorizing and a misreading of a number of important cases and instances of stra-
tegic behavior.”); Malcolm R. Burns, Predatory Pricing and the Acquisition Costs of Competi-
tors, 94 J. POL. ECON. 266 (1986) (an impressive empirical study); Janusz A. Ordover & Garth 
Saloner,  Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust,  in H ANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION (R. Schmalensee & R.D. Willig eds. 1989); Joel B. Dirlam, Marginal Cost 
Pricing Tests for Predation: Naïve Welfare Economics and Public Policy, 26 ANTITRUST 
BULL. 769 (1981).  See also Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Predatory Pricing and 
Strategic Theory, 89 GEO. L.J. 2475 (2001); Patrick Bolton et. al, Predatory Pricing: Response 012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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the verge of supporting the proposition that, contrary to respectable eco-
nomic opinion and Supreme Court dicta: 
 
A.  false predation positives or condemnations are not, in the 
words of Justice Scalia quoting Matsushita, “especially costly 
[i.e. worse than false negatives], because they chill the very 
conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect”
40—a bro-
mide that fails to differentiate the initiation of price competi-
tion from the response that punishes and suppresses it and re-
stores the status quo ante; 
B.  predation may well have occurred, and succeeded, even if the 
incumbent, while successfully restoring the pre-competitive-
entry prices, failed to restore them long and high enough to 
earn back in excess profits what it earlier gave back in its puta-
tively predatory prices—with interest.
41 
 
In my reckoning, a dollar of producer surplus gained or lost is not fully 
equivalent to a dollar of consumer surplus lost or gained, particularly—
but not only—in terms of the purpose of the antitrust laws.
42
As to the putative equivalence of false positives and negatives,
43 I 
would have it suffice for a successful charge of predation that: 
 
A.  the entrant or challenger offer some group or subgroup of cus-
tomers service on terms that a sufficient number initially find 
attractive enough to ensure its ability to continue to offer it—
thereby demonstrating that those customers were not previ-
ously enjoying service at the stand alone costs of serving 
them;
44 
to Critique and Further Elaboration, 89 GEO. L.J. 2495 (2001); Alvin K. Klevorick, The Cur-
rent State of the Law and Economics of Predatory Pricing, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 162 (1993); 
Aaron S. Edlin & Joseph Farrell, The American Airlines Case: A Chance to Clarify Predation 
Policy  (Competition Policy Ctr., Paper CPC02-33, 2002), available at 
http://repositories.cdlib.org/iber/cpc/CPC02-033; Alfred E. Kahn, Thinking About Predation—
A Personal Diary, 6 REV. INDUS. ORG. 137 (1991). 
  40. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. at 414 (quoting Matsushita Elec. In-
dus. Co., 475 U.S. at 594). 
  41. “In order to recoup their losses, [predators] must obtain enough market power to set 
higher than competitive prices, and then must sustain those prices long enough to earn in ex-
cess profits what they earlier gave up in below-cost prices.” Brooke Group Ltd., 509 U.S. at 
225-26 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 590-91). 
  42. See, e.g., Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & Donald S. Cooper, An Empirical and Theoretical 
Comparison of Alternative Predation Rules, 61 TEX. L. REV. 655, 680, 688 (1982). 
  43. See Paul L. Joskow & Alvin K. Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory 
Pricing Policy, 89 YALE L.J. 213 (1979). 
  44. See W ILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF 
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 508-09 (1982), on this rule, at least at one time purportedly expatiating 012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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B.  the incumbent respond with similarly sharp reductions, pin-
pointed at the specific market niche that has been invaded, and 
especially if it also increases its capacity, demonstrating an in-
tention to leave no room for the intruder in the market—a 
market expanded—only momentarily, alas—by the latter’s 
challenge, 
C.  driving out the intruder or forcing it to withdraw its consumer-
attracting offerings, following upon which 
D.  the incumbent restores its previous price levels (and presuma-
bly resumes rationing its low-price offerings).
45 
 
It is only by a trick of rhetoric, however frequently repeated, that the in-
cumbent is identified as a practitioner and advocate of “hard,” the re-
pulsed intruder of “soft” competition: in the immortal words of John 
McEnroe, “[Justices Kennedy and Scalia], you can’t be serious!” 
Confronting just such a history in the treble damages suit of Spirit 
against Northwest Airlines, the District Court resolved the hotly con-
tested, unfortunately still-critical issue of the pertinent measure of mar-
ginal costs—complicated enormously by the incumbent’s sharp (and 
temporary) increase in capacity on the contested route—in favor of the 
defendant, and dismissed the suit; the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 
sending the case back for retrial.
46  One can only hope that the jury to 
which the Circuit Court has consigned the case will be presented with the 
on the suggestion in ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 142-43 (1971). 
  45. This definition of the offense accords in spirit precisely with William J. Baumol’s 
proposed remedy—and preventive—fully 27 years ago, supplementing the Areeda/Turner test: 
that incumbent firms engaging in such patterns of behavior be—and be so informed in ad-
vance—required to maintain their predatory offerings “quasi-permanently”—which I have 
generally interpreted as a year or two following the departure of the object of the predation.  
William J. Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Preda-
tory Pricing, 89 YALE L.J. 1 (1979).  I take additional personal satisfaction from the fact that 
the Baumol article referred specifically to the concerted response of the major international air 
carriers to the Sky Train offered by Laker Airlines beginning in 1977, which I had previously 
persuaded my colleagues at the Civil Aeronautics Board to disallow as predatory—for which 
“regulatory” intervention I was widely criticized by deregulatory purists less supportive than I 
of the antitrust laws.  See my fuller description of this case and of what ensued in Kahn, Think-
ing About Predation—A Personal Diary, supra note 39, at 138-39. 
I have always been amused by the defense of accused airline parties in such circum-
stances that they had to increase capacity in order not to have to turn away all the customers 
newly attracted by their drastically reduced fares (see, e.g., Levine, supra note 35, at 32, 34) 
and, correspondingly, to reduce their capacity when that demand abated—as though, despite 
their justly self-proclaimed skills in yield management, they were taken wholly by surprise by 
those changes and had no choice but to do whatever necessary to accommodate them.  Mani-
festly, the fare reduction was much greater than needed to defend their previous levels of traf-
fic and predatory in both intent and effect. 
  46. Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 F.3d 917 (6th Cir. 2005).  See 
also Alfred E. Kahn, Comments on Exclusionary Airline Pricing, 5 J. AIR TRANSPORT MGMT. 
1 (1999). 012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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question in plain English of which side represented preservation of the 
competitive process, which its suppression, whether in intent or effect. 
Speaking for the Supreme Court in affirming a lower court’s deter-
mination that Standard Oil of New Jersey had violated Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act, Chief Justice White delivered the classic enunciation of 
the rule of reason: that the antitrust laws condemn 
All contracts or acts . . . unreasonably restrictive of competitive con-
ditions, either from the nature . . . of the contract or act or where the 
surrounding circumstances were such as . . . to give rise to the infer-
ence or presumption that they had been entered into or done with the 
intent to do wrong to the general public and to limit the right of indi-
viduals, thus restraining the free flow of commerce . . . .
47
As to the judicially asserted primacy of Areeda/Turner, one aspect 
of its logic is compelling—that if the competition-meeting or beating 
prices of the incumbent exceeded its marginal costs, yet drove the in-
truder out, it must mean that the former was more efficient, and produc-
tive efficiency would therefore be better served by the incumbent carry-
ing the traffic than the challenger.  BUT—setting aside the sometimes 
extreme uncertainty about the pertinent measurements of marginal cost—
if the sequence of events clearly betrayed a predatory intent and the end 
result was without question a huge loss of consumer surplus, that test is 
either superfluous or perverse.
 48
Having said all this about the airlines case, I must concede that there 
seems to be ample basis in the airline experience of the last decade, with 
the dramatic increase in the market share of low-fare competitors, for the 
proposition that while there may be plenty of instances in which preda-
tion was proximately successful, there is at least one major respect in 
  47. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58 (1911).  Observe the convergence 
of this last evidence of predatory intent with the remedy proposed by Baumol, supra note 45, 
which I have endorsed as a means of bypassing or resolving the issue of predatory intent, see 
ALFRED E. KAHN, WHOM THE GODS WOULD DESTROY, OR HOW NOT TO DEREGULATE 70 
n.80 (2001), http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php? id=112. 
  48. The other part of the Areeda/Turner logic is that if the incumbent priced below its 
marginal costs, suffering out-of-pocket losses on those sales, it could only have been with 
predatory intent—that is, in the expectation of recouping them after it had succeeded in elimi-
nating the competition.  As a teacher of elementary economics some 40 years ago, I am embar-
rassed to have had to be reminded by Aaron Edlin and Joseph Farrell that in the presence of 
impure or imperfect competition, that test would be excessively lenient: a profit-maximizing 
seller would offer service only up to the earlier—i.e., lower—point at which not price—as un-
der Areeda/Turner—but marginal revenue was equated to marginal cost.  In other words, a 
competition-meeting or -beating price equal to marginal cost—the Areeda/Turner test to the 
contrary—would involve actual out-of-pocket losses if, as would almost certainly be typical, 
sales at the competition-meeting level would cannibalize—i.e., be at the expense of—sales that 
could otherwise have continued to be made at or closer to pre-entry prices, as was clearly the 
case in Northwest Airlines’ response to Spirit.  Edlin & Farrell, supra note 39, at 14-16. 012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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which it has been ultimately unsuccessful. 
The essence of the rule of reason is its recognition that the ultimate, 
unexceptionable goal of antitrust—preservation of the competitive proc-
ess—demands a distinction between essentially beneficent competitive 
advantages or market power stemming from a firm’s “superior product, 
business acumen, or historical accident,” from ones deriving from its 
“willful acquisition or maintenance ... by unlawful or exclusionary prac-
tices.”
49
In the next section I appraise the sufficiency of the prior conditions 
for deregulation that I advocate in Part I and of antitrust enforcement 
thereafter, as conceived in Part II, to resolve the intensely contested issue 
of network neutrality. 
III.  “NETWORK NEUTRALITY” 
These conflicting views of the proper focus of the antitrust laws in 
an industry increasingly subject to deregulation are evidently coming 
into focus in the legislative and public arena in demands of a wide diver-
sity of interested parties, along with a large segment of the press, for 
“network neutrality.”  I was for a long time far from having a satisfactory 
grasp of what exactly that means or why its advocacy has taken on an 
almost messianic ardor.
50
That advocacy has apparently coalesced around the explicit con-
cern—set off by the FCC’s decision in the Brand X case
51 to exempt ca-
ble companies from common carriage obligations—that the competition 
among providers of broadband access, predominantly ILECs and cable 
companies, might be insufficient to protect either subscribers, at one end, 
or providers of programming or content, at the other.
52  Or to protect 
  49. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966); see also United States 
v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 343-45 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d, 347 U.S. 
521 (1954). 
  50. I take some solace from the fact that at a recent conference on telecom policy, others 
far more at ease than I with matters pertaining to the Internet proclaimed a similar uncertainty, 
if not mystification, suggesting to me that the earlier confusion may have been attributable to 
an excess of exposition by metaphor.  But see, more recently, contributing to my progressive 
enlightenment, Hahn & Wallsten, supra note 11; Paul Ganely & Ben Allgrove, Net Neutrality: 
A User’s Guide, 22 COMPUTER  L.  &  SECURITY  REP. (forthcoming 2006), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=925693; Robert D. Atkinson & Philip J. Weiser, A ‘Third Way’ on 
Network Neutrality, May 30, 2006, http://www.innovationpolicy.org/pdf/netneutrality.pdf; see 
also Kim Hart & Sarah Kehaulani Goo, Tech Faceoff: Net Neutrality in the Eye of the Be-
holder, WASH. POST, July 2, 2006, at F4. 
  51. The FCC’s decision was on appeal voided by a Circuit Court of Appeals, then ulti-
mately sustained by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n. v. Brand X 
Internet Servs., 543 U.S. 1185 (2005). 
  52. See, e.g., Cerf, supra note 2, at 2-10.  Also, however, a (recently discovered) full-
scale rationalization in terms at least partly of the perceived inadequacy of competition be-
tween duopolists, Michelle Chen, Activists Bring the Digital Frontier to New Communities, 012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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content providers from anticompetitive vertical price squeezes, exclusion 
from access, or denials (or, once again, excessive charges for) the prior-
ity transmission that their signals may require—all of which practices 
have already been condemned by the regulatory authorities in both Can-
ada and the United States and emphatically should be condemned also 
under the antitrust laws.
53  I understood Professor Lawrence Lessig—a 
most prominent advocate—to have assured an audience of which I was a 
member, however, that the advocacy of network neutrality is concerned 
with neither the effectiveness of antitrust policy nor issues of regulation 
and deregulation—that framing the debate in either of those terms is 
“counterproductive”—an assurance amply reflected in his writings. 
But either that is exactly what it is or should be about or—their 
rhetoric of “monopoly” and “discriminations” and squeezes notwith-
standing—the advocates are really talking about social goals that cannot 
be achieved by a market economy, however perfectly functioning—uses 
of resources and distributions of income in their opinion properly subject 
to extra-market, political determination. 
As to the first of these conceptions—I will return eventually to the 
second—whatever else is involved, broadband access to the Internet is a 
scarce good or service; priority in transmission required for such uses as 
voice over the Internet and telemedical diagnosis and treatment even 
more so.  And they can be provided in the short run only by lower prior-
ity transmission of other signals and, in the longer term, by investment.  
Society cannot avoid deciding in one way or other to what extent its re-
sources are to be deployed in this way, and how the services they create 
are to be allotted, rationed or prioritized among potential users, at one 
end or the other.
54  This necessarily involves evaluation of the adequacy 
MEDIACHANNEL.ORG, Jan. 3, 2005, and supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text. 
  53. Forbearance from the Regulation of Retail Local Exchange Services, supra note 7, at 
¶¶265-68; Atkinson & Weiser, supra note 50, at 3 (citing Madison River Communications 
LLC, Consent Decree, 20 FCC Rcd. 4,295 (2005)); see also infra text accompanying notes 81-
83. 
  54. See, e.g., Robert E. Litan, Catching the Web in a Net of Neutrality (AEI/Brookings 
Joint Center, Pol’y Matters 06-10, May 2006), available at  http://www.aei-
brookings.org/policy/page.php?id=252. 
Professor Susan P. Crawford’s analogy between the control over high-speed Internet ac-
cess by the telephone and cable companies and the private ownership of ocean-shore property, 
in a position to block access to the “ocean commons,” is evocative but also revealing of the 
ambiguities in the goal and logic of network neutrality.  Susan P. Crawford, Network Rules, 69 
DUKE J.L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://scrawford.net/display/ 
061406%20network%20rules.doc.  “Ocean-shore property” might refer merely to the beach-
front land, Henry George’s condemnation of the private appropriation of the benefits of which 
remains impeccable.  I am, for example, a strong advocate of public beaches. 
In contrast, the networks that writers such as she and Professor Lessig would render “neu-
tral” represent capital, which has to be created by real investment—the taxation of which 
George opposed.  High-speed Internet access clearly falls in the latter category, not the former.  
The beachfront analogy is therefore either totally inapt—or it is a variant of the proposition, 012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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of our present institutions for making those decisions—unregulated com-
petition, subject to the antitrust laws, direct regulation or extra-market, 
political determination. 
Indeed, the very specters Professor Lessig evokes if Congress fails 
to mandate network neutrality—that cable and phone companies will be 
free to 
discriminat[e] against content providers . . . create different tiers of 
online service . . . sell access to the express lane to deep-pocketed 
corporations and relegate everyone else to the digital equivalent of a 
winding dirt road . . . . earn huge profits . . . slow or even block the 
Websites and services of their competitors or those who refuse to pay 
up
55—  
are, despite his assurances to the contrary, precisely specters raised by 
deregulation and reflect the assumption that competition subject to anti-
trust will be incapable of forestalling such “discriminations.” 
Moreover—as my use of quotation marks is intended to suggest—
these dire predictions betray a failure to understand the difference be-
tween price discriminations, such as might be taken to reflect inadequa-
cies of competition, and differentiations on the basis of differences in 
costs, such as would unequivocally be reflective of effective competition.  
The  opposition to “tiering” as such—extra charges for “access to the ex-
press lane,” “guarantee [of] quality delivery,”
56 prohibitions of which are 
already embodied in bills introduced by Representative Markey and 
Senators Wyden, Snowe and Dorgan—is economically ignorant.  The 
costs—both short-run (the opportunity costs of giving priority to the 
higher-speed uses) and long-run (the costs of the investments to provide 
additional broadband capacity, to relieve that congestion)—are, pre-
sumably, higher for the users requiring the “express lane.”  It is therefore 
not discriminatory for those costs to be levied on the services requiring 
their incurrence—provided only, once again, that there be no discrimina-
tion against the independent providers in favor of the corresponding 
which deserves consideration on its own merits, that, even though broadband access requires 
real investment, its availability to the public should not be determined exclusively by the lat-
ter’s ability and willingness to pay (see infra text accompanying notes 66-67).  (This last is, 
however, evidently not the conception of Mark Cooper, a strong proponent of net neutrality—
see infra notes 59 and 66.)  That consideration apart—and that, precisely, is how it should be 
handled—the pertinent question would be whether the charges to end users or to providers of 
programming or content are or will be sufficiently constrained by competition. 
  55. Lawrence Lessig & Robert W. McChesney, No Tolls on The Internet, WASH. POST, 
June 8, 2006, at A23; but see Kyle D. Dixon, Rhetoric vs. Reality: Lessig and McChesney on 
Network Neutrality, 2006 PROGRESS  &  FREEDOM  FOUND.  PROGRESS  SNAPSHOT  RELEASE 
2.14, http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2006/ps_2.14_netneut_lessig.pdf. 
  56. Lessig & McChesney, supra note 55, at A23. 012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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competing retail services of the broadband providers themselves.
57
It is difficult for an economist to understand why if, as a New Re-
public editorial supporting a Congressional mandate of net neutrality 
points out, without apparent disapproval, that 
Content providers from Google and Amazon to Daily Kos and TNR 
Online currently pay Web-hosting companies to put their content on 
the Internet [and] still make money by charging homes and busi-
nesses higher fees for faster or more dependable services, 
its editors should consider it objectionable that the providers of broad-
band Internet access 
[W]ill be able to charge content providers a fee to deliver their con-
tent to consumers and, in particular, an additional surcharge to deliver 
their content to consumers more quickly . . . [and] even charge lucra-
tive fees to companies for exclusive access to the fast lane at the ex-
pense of their competitors.
58
Or why, analogously, newspapers should not then be required to re-
cover all of their common costs from readers, or radio and television 
broadcasters from listeners and viewers: yet that is exactly what some 
network neutrality proponents explicitly advocate.
59
Equally ignorant, though perhaps understandable, has been the 
  57. See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion (Van-
derbilt University Law School, Working Paper Number 05-28, 2005), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=825669. 
  58. Editorial, Open Net, NEW REPUBLIC, June 26, 2006, at 7.  Setting aside the possibility 
that the fees will be—by implication, excessively—”lucrative,” that is, reflective of a failure of 
deregulation to satisfy the precondition of effective competition; or that “exclusive access to 
the fast lane” might constitute an unreasonable restraint on competition properly subject to 
condemnation under the antitrust laws, it is difficult to understand why it would be improper or 
inconsistent with effective competition for those fees to vary with the quality and quantity—
hence in the short run the opportunity costs and in the long run the investment costs of provid-
ing such services, about which advocates of network neutrality express particular concern, as 
[v]ideo and voice pictures, which take up more room in the Internet pipeline, clog 
the networks and decrease the speed for everyone. 
Hart & Goo, supra note 50, at F4 (emphasis added).  Query: is this a good so “public” in na-
ture as to justify its subsidization? 
  59. For example, Mark Cooper, Director of Research of the Consumer [sic] Federation of 
America: “Let the consumer pay—it is the consumer that uses the network.”  LARRY DARBY, 
AM. CONSUMER INST., CONSUMER WELFARE, CAPITAL FORMATION AND NET NEUTRALITY 6 
(2006), http://www.theamericanconsumer.org/Net%20Neutrality%20Study.pdf.  See Darby’s 
comprehensive assessment of the (negative) welfare effect of that implicit proposal to prohibit 
the common practice in other such two-sided markets of charging both sets of customers—
such as advertisers, on the one side, and purchasers of media services containing those mes-
sages, on the other.  See generally David S. Evans & Richard Schmalensee, The Industrial Or-
ganization of Markets with Two-sided Platforms (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 11603, 2005). 012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
2006]  TELECOMMUNICATIONS 179 
 
widespread indignation provoked by the impolitic assertion by Ed Whi-
tacre, CEO of SBC, that 
[W]hat [Google and other Internet content providers] would like to 
do is use my pipes free, but I ain’t going to let them do that because 
we have spent this capital that we have to have a return on it . . . Why 
should they be allowed to use my pipes?
60
Both more politic and more illuminating was the explanation of 
Richard Notebaert, CEO of Qwest, 
that he views Google and Amazon as valued customers whose appli-
cations enhance the value of Qwest’s DSL to consumers.  He pro-
ceeded to explain that Qwest should also be able to [offer] premium 
services, for additional fees, that guarantee certain levels of service 
(such as Federal Express offers L.L. Bean for holiday shipping).
61
As to the danger of those suppliers exploiting any residual monop-
oly power they may enjoy by virtue of their essential duopoly (or mo-
nopoly
62), the pragmatic, most readily available remedy would be the 
ubiquitous deployment of wireless broadband services, in addition to, 
and independent of, telephone and cable companies—the assessment of 
which belongs in the domain of the decision whether or not to deregulate 
in the first place. 
What Mr. Notebaert was emphasizing, entirely correctly, was the 
essential congruence of the interest of his company with that of inde-
pendent offerers of content in competing for subscribers to its broadband 
transport service—the same congruence as between the movie houses 
and producers of motion pictures, between broadcasters and suppliers of 
programs
63—subject, to be sure, to the possible need for government in-
tervention to preclude vertical squeezes or other unreasonably exclusion-
ary practices by parties with monopoly power.  A provider of broadband 
service needs Google and e-Bay as much as they need it: consider the 
likely effect on the willingness of subscribers to pay a cable or phone 
company for broadband service if one or the other could not come to 
terms with those suppliers of popular content. 
Analogously to the current demands for network neutrality, I recog-
  60. Atkinson & Weiser, supra note 50, at 6 (quoting Patricia O’Connell, At SBC, It’s all 
about “Scale and Scope,” BUS. WK. ONLINE, Nov. 7, 2005, http://www.businessweek.com/ 
@@n34h*IUQu%207KtOwgA/magazine/content/05_45/b3958092.htm). 
  61. Id. at 7. 
  62. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
  63. See James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open 
Access Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE L. ON REG. 39, 43, 87 (2000); Atkinson & 
Weiser, supra note 50, at  6-9. 012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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nized some 23 years ago the logic by which cable television companies 
might, as beneficiaries of exclusive territorial franchises, be subjected to 
common carrier obligations, in order to ensure unaffiliated suppliers of 
programming access to audiences equal to that of affiliated ones; but rec-
ognized even at the time that such a requirement would on balance be 
anticompetitive.
64  By a similar logic, I was for a time sympathetic with 
the FCC rules—later abandoned, however, with my support—denying 
broadcasters the right to have a financial interest in the programs they 
carried and in their subsequent syndication, once again to avoid a tempta-
tion on their part to discriminate against independent suppliers in favor 
of their own.  I eventually recognized, however—consistently in princi-
ple with the position I espouse here—that both of those policies were un-
dermined by the increasing competition for programming among the 
several broadcast networks, including cable systems, and the positive 
competitive benefits of vertical integration—in this case the especial in-
terest of broadcasters in ensuring the flow of “quality” programming by 
directly investing in its development.
65
  64.  [W]hile I have argued for substantial deregulation of the rates charged by cable 
TV operators, I confess to some uneasiness about the effect of their ability to produce 
their own programs, coupled with their comparative freedom from common carriage 
obligations, on the access of independent program producers to the market. . . . 
The rationale for deregulation, however, is the growing variety of alternatives avail-
able to viewers; and the case for integration of programming or program production, 
on the one side, and transmission, on the other, is the special incentive that a cable 
company has to develop an adequate flow of supply—adequate in quantity, reliabil-
ity, quality, and diversity—to fill those burgeoning yawning gaps that it is its obli-
gation to fill.  In view, moreover, of the fact that the cable companies face intensify-
ing competition from the networks, suppliers of pay TV programming like HBO and 
Showtime, direct satellite broadcasters, and the rest, it is difficult to see any danger 
that non-integrated producers will be foreclosed from a fair opportunity to market 
their wares. 
The suggestion that cable companies become mere common carriers of programs 
supplied by others—like the proposed confinement of the Bell Operating Compa-
nies to the provision of local exchange service and the exclusion of AT&T, after di-
vestiture, from the origination, control, or financial participation in the information 
transmitted over its Long Lines—has the attraction of tidiness and the benefit of 
maximizing the insurance against unfair competition.  But it is also anticompetitive, 
because it excludes the cable operator from programming, and to that extent sacri-
fices the dynamic benefits of integration.  In the cable context, the dangers of inte-
gration seem to me insufficient to justify its prohibition. 
Alfred E. Kahn, The Passing of the Public Utility Concept: A Reprise,  in 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS  REGULATION  TODAY AND TOMORROW 24-25 (Eli M. Noam ed., 
1983).  It has of course been the FCC’s recent confirmation of its exemption of cable broad-
band facilities from such an obligation, sustained by the Supreme Court in 2005, that has set 
off the network neutrality movement. See Brand X Internet Servs., 543 U.S. at 1185. 
  65. See Comments of Alfred E. Kahn to Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in Amendment 
of 47 CFR § 73.658(j)(1)(i) and (ii), the Syndication and Financial Interest Rules, BC Dkt. No. 
82-345 (1983). 012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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This is not to exclude the possibility that—in contrast with televi-
sion broadcasting or motion picture exhibition—broadband access is best 
treated as a public good.  But public goods, strictly, are ones the use of 
which has a zero marginal cost and that are for this reason most effi-
ciently subjected to no usage charges.  Demonstrably, however, broad-
band facilities have to be created by investment, and applications requir-
ing priority transmission impose opportunity costs on others; except as 
subsidized by government—a possibility I do not exclude
66—those costs 
must be collected from users—subscribers to broadband services, pro-
viders of programming or content, or some combination of the two. 
In the light of those realities, the advocacy of network neutrality 
seems at times poetic or metaphorical: it is apparently a successor or 
complement to the ideal of a “Commons,” open and used without social 
cost or, therefore, charge to anyone who wishes to use it.  Manifestly, 
Internet access does not satisfy that definition.  The case for treating it 
nevertheless as a public good, deserving of direct governmental subsidy 
or provision, must rest instead on the proposition, by no means unrea-
sonable, that it provides benefits to the public at large—external to the 
direct transacters—sufficient to justify public subsidy.  Entirely logically, 
therefore, one part of Atkinson and Weiser’s three-part, “Third Way” 
resolution of the network neutrality issue is that Congress provide finan-
cial incentives to private investments in broadband networks.
67
Each passing day, the views and demands of the network neutrality 
advocates have become more hysterically apocalyptic, violently splitting 
the historical—and, alas, perhaps ephemeral—coalition of eighteenth and 
twentieth century liberals that produced the deregulations of air and sur-
face transportation.  On June 9th, the New York Times carried a full-page 
advertisement sponsored by the unlikely trio, MoveOn, a liberal advo-
cacy organization, the Christian Coalition of America and the Gun Own-
ers of America, “joining together to keep AT&T from controlling what 
you see and do on-line.”
68  Presumably proceeding on the assumption 
  66. That, I presume, is the logic behind Philadelphia’s and San Francisco’s (among oth-
ers’) municipal WiFi systems, which—though still of limited capacity—might be the model 
for a much-needed third competitor of what might otherwise be a duopoly, especially if and as 
wireless service providers merge with ILECs or cable companies.  See supra notes 10 and 53. 
Alternatively, or additionally, such ventures are obviously being advocated as a means of ex-
tending broadband service to members of the public who could not otherwise afford it: see the 
excellent summary of “grassroots” initiatives to “bridge the digital divide and network low-
income communities.” Chen, supra note 52.  I am not prepared to resolve the obvious ideo-
logical question of whether broadband access to the Internet has in the short space of a decade 
become such a necessity as to justify its public subsidization—or appraise the possibility that 
such taxpayer-subsidized offerings will significantly impair the incentives of private parties to 
invest in broadband facilities—that is, to answer the question of whether the two systems can 
coexist. 
  67. Atkinson & Weiser, supra note 50, at 14. 
  68. Advertisement, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2006, at A17. 012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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that the specter of AT&T (which, as the provider of “the best telephone 
service in the world,” would have been a positive factor many decades 
ago) would be more frightening than Verizon, Qwest, Comcast or Time 
Warner, the advertisement raises the inevitable question, among the even 
moderately informed: why would any of those offerers of broadband 
Internet service to end users be in a position, or find it in its interest, to 
limit its offerings by blocking access of non-affiliated offerers of content 
to its subscribers, except as would clearly invoke antitrust liability?  This 
seems to me clearly necessary: a cable or telephone company provider of 
Internet access might well have the motive of “blocking access of non-
affiliated offerers of content” in preference to its own; but clearly that 
would and should bring quick condemnation under the antitrust laws.
69
In these controversies, the opinion of respectable economists, once 
the conditions for deregulation are satisfied, is necessarily one of opposi-
tion to any mandate of common carrier obligations—which would pre-
sumably have to involve also regulation of the rates charged by tele-
phone, cable and wireless companies for use of their respective Internet 
access facilities—or, as the advocates of network neutrality would evi-
dently have it, flat prohibitions of charges—or of charges for priority 
transmission—to suppliers of content.
70
69.  See infra p. 175; see also supra pp. 187-188. 
  70. For example, from my own, moderately liberal local newspaper: 
Since the beginning of the 20
th century ‘common carriage’ rules have required 
phone companies to treat all users alike.  No one gets a better connection based on 
how much they’re willing to pay . . . . It is a neutral network. 
Since the birth and rise of the Internet almost two decades ago, that same concept 
applied.  Known as ‘network neutrality,’ the people who provide your Internet con-
nection were barred from arbitrarily saying where you could surf.  It also means all 
connections work the same, so the site run by some community news blogger can 
load just as fast as the Gannett-backed site you may be reading this editorial on to-
day.  That electronic liberty and democracy is the reason the Internet has exploded 
and changed American and world culture . . . . 
Until now. 
In mid 2005, the Federal Communications Commission redefined how it regulates 
the Internet, ending the common carriage policy for this medium.  A major tele-
communications overhaul making its way through  Congress . . . contains no provi-
sion that secures network neutrality.  The bill . . . would allow phone and cable 
companies to create a multi-tiered system where site operators pay more for higher 
speed and better service.  Companies could also inhibit or block access to certain 
sites—say, those of a commercial competitor or some troublesome political 
group . . . . 
For the preservation of the Internet—for its own sake and in the name of the free 
and equal exchange of ideas that has been . . . its greatest gift to American democ-
racy—Internet network neutrality must be preserved. 
Editorial, Internet neutrality: U.S. must defend democracy online, ITHACA JOURNAL, May 25, 
2006, at 7A, available at  http://www.theithacajournal.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/ 
20060525/OPINION01/605250312/1014. Of course the Journal’s first sentence is incorrect: 
subscribers—particularly business subscribers—have always paid different rates for different 012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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But this is where we came in—the consensus of most economists 
that that kind of regulation is in essential conflict with and obstructive of 
the developing dynamic competition among technologically different 
platforms and, in particular, the heavy investments of the ILECs in fiber-
to-the-premises, which will enable them to offer video, in direct competi-
tion with the hitherto franchised cable companies.
71  That kind of dy-
namic market is the least suited for public utility-style regulation.  As 
Christopher Yoo perceptively observes, the demand for “network neu-
trality” could in this way discourage the achievement of the ultimately 
more important “network diversity”—in particular the aforementioned 
competition between local telephone and cable companies in the offer of 
video service.
72  In that view the advocates of network neutrality are pro-
capacities of their lines; and that is exactly the logic of the unchallenged separate charge for 
DSL. 
See also Editorial, supra note 58, at 7 (an editorial to the same effect in the similarly 
moderately liberal The New Republic); and 
Congress is going to hand the operation of the Internet over to AT&T, Verizon and 
Comcast . . . It’s a shame . . . . 
Telephone and cable companies own 98% of the high-speed broadband networks 
the public uses to go online for reading news, shopping, listening to music, posting 
videos or any of the thousands of other uses developed for the Internet. But that isn’t 
enough. They want to control what you read, see or hear online. The companies say 
that they will create premium lanes on the Internet for higher fees, and give prefer-
ential access to their own services and those who can afford extra charges. The rest 
of us will be left to use an inferior version of the Internet. 
Art Brodsky, Congress Is Giving Away the Internet, and You Won’t Like Who Gets It, TPM 
CAFÉ, Apr. 23, 2006, http://www.tpmcafe.com/node/29086 (emphasis supplied). 
The staid New York Times has been scarcely less apocalyptic.  See Editorial, Keeping a 
Democratic Web, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2006, at A24; Adam Cohen, Why the Democratic Ethic 
of the World Wide Web May Be about to End, N.Y.TIMES, May 28, 2006, at D9.  Cohen states: 
This democratic Web did not just happen.  Sir Tim Berners-Lee, British computer 
scientist who invented the Web in 1989, envisioned a platform on which everyone 
in the world could communicate on an equal basis.  But his vision is being threat-
ened by telecommunications and cable companies, and other Internet service pro-
viders, that want to impose a new system of fees that could create a hierarchy of 
Web sites.  Major corporate sites would be able to pay the new fees, while little-guy 
sites could be shut out . . . . 
Corporations that stand to make billions if they can push tiered pricing through have 
put together a slick lobbying and marketing campaign . . . . 
Internet service providers would like to be able to charge Web sites for access to 
their customers.  Web sites that could not pay the new fees would be accessible at a 
slower speed, or perhaps not be accessible at all . . . . 
Customers who are used to the robust, democratic Web may not pay for one that is 
restricted to wealthy corporate content providers. 
  71. See ALFRED E. KAHN, LESSONS FROM DEREGULATION: TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND 
AIRLINES AFTER THE CRUNCH 43-45 (2004), available at  http://www.aei-
brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php? id=303 (supporting the FCC decision in February 
2003 to exempt the ILECs from the obligation to share such facilities). 
  72. Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV.  J.L.  &  TECH. 1, 48 
(2005); see also Speta, supra note 63, at 43. 012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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posing in effect to equalize the regulatory status of the competing ILECs 
and cable companies by bringing the latter in under the former’s public 
utility regulatory tent—just the opposite of what turbulent Schumpeterian 
competition demands.
73  The advocates of regulated—or zero—charges 
to the providers of Internet content must respond to the challenge: by 
what reasoning can they justify such a proscription applied to cable and 
telephone companies in the process of constructing extremely expensive 
broadband highways—except as they are prepared to advocate govern-
ment financing (such as used to be described as “taxpayer-financed,” be-
fore a feckless Federal Administration found a magical way of hugely 
reducing taxes and increasing expenditures at the same time). 
Their assumption is, evidently, that competition among Internet ac-
cess providers is inadequate to protect both the consuming public and 
suppliers of content.  There is clearly room therefore for agreement be-
tween proponents and opponents that, as I have already proposed, de-
regulation be conditioned on sufficient, independent competition from at 
least a third mode—presumably wireless, assured by freeing up more of 
the spectrum—while hoping for successful entry also of broadband over 
the ubiquitous power lines.  Both the Statement on U.S. Broadband Pol-
icy, issued in March 2006 by 27 prominent economists,
74 and the several 
DACA reports add the very sensible recommendation that Congress pre-
empt and eliminate the thousands of local franchising regulations that re-
strict competitive entry and provisioning of broadband access services.
75
Ironically, more or less simultaneously with adding to the present 
tsunami of demands for immediate passage of legislation to preserve a 
  73. See Net Neutrality: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Trans-
portation, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Kyle D. Dixon, Senior Fellow & Director, Federal 
Institute for Regulatory Law & Economics, Progress & Freedom Foundation); see On H.R. __, 
a Committee Print on the Communications Opportunity, Promotion, and Enhancement Act of 
2006: Before the Subcomm. on Telecomm. & the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy & Com-
merce, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Randolph May, Senior Fellow & Director. of Com-
munications Policy Studies, Progress & Freedom Foundation). 
  74. Elizabeth E. Bailey et al., Economists’ Statement on U.S. Broadband Policy (AEI-
Brookings Joint Center for Reg. Stud., Related Publication 06-06, March 2006), 
http://www.aei-brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=1252 (last visited Aug. 4, 2006); 
see also Hahn & Wallsten, supra note 50; Thomas W. Hazlett, Cable TV Franchises as Barri-
ers to Video Competition (George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Se-
ries 06-06,  March 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=889406. 
  75. Since those local franchises typically impose public utility-type obligations to serve 
on the franchised entities—specifically, that they build out their facilities throughout the fran-
chise territory at regulated rates typically diverging from interregional differences in cost, it 
would clearly be politically necessary to add some alternative competitively neutral methods 
of providing the requisite subsidies, all subsumed under the goal of “universal service”—no 
small matter, to be sure.  See RAYMOND L. GIFFORD ET AL., PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., 
DECEMBER, PROPOSAL OF THE UNIVERSAL SERVICE WORKING GROUP RELEASE 2.0 (2005), 
http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/books/051207daca-usf-2.0.pdf. 012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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“robust, democratic web”
76 to protect independent contributors to the 
“free and equal exchange of ideas,” the New York Times has run a num-
ber of separate, lengthy stories describing diverse contemporaneous ef-
forts to finance just such ventures, to expand the competing offerings of 
the requisite broadband access: 
In an ambitious proposal, a Silicon Valley company has asked the 
government to give it a band of radio spectrum for a free high-speed 
wireless Internet network that would cover most of the country and 
be supported by advertising.
77
And 
Google is taking its first steps to go after the huge market for televi-
sion advertising this week with a new service that will place video 
commercials on the many Web sites where it sells advertising.
78
  76. Cohen, supra note 70, at D9. 
  77. Matt Richtel, Company Asks U.S. to Provide Radio Space for Free Internet, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 23, 2006, at C3. 
  78. Advertisers have been eager to buy the relatively limited supply of spaces for 
online commercials at prices that equal and sometimes exceed the rates charged by major 
networks, as measured by cost per thousand viewers . . . . 
Google’s announcement came a week after AOL said that it had acquired Lighten-
ingcast, a company that sells video advertisements on about 150 sites . . . . 
Google has become a powerhouse in advertising largely by selling short text adver-
tising closely associated with topics people are researching or reading about on the 
Web.  But it is increasingly looking to place more elaborate advertisements that are 
more attractive to marketers promoting product brands.  Last year, it started allow-
ing advertisers to bid to place advertisements using graphics and animation on sites 
it represents. 
Saul Hansell, Google Moves to Sell Space for Video Spots on Network of Web Sites, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 23, 2006, at C3. 
And, some two weeks later, 
Testers who volunteer to offer feedback for the Mountain View project will be able 
to sign up for Wi-Fi starting sometime this summer, and the service will be widely 
available to the public later this year, Chris Sacca, head of special initiatives at 
Google, said Wednesday. . . .Meanwhile, Google’s free Wi-Fi service in San Fran-
cisco may or may not have advertisements, he said.  ‘If we get to the point that we 
decide that providing ads to end users is a benefit, then we might do it,’ he said.  
Ads are ‘not driving this. . .For us it is much more of an experiment and a lofty so-
cial benefit’. . . .Last year, San Francisco began a process of soliciting bids from po-
tential providers of a free Wi-Fi service that would blanket the city’s nearly 49-
square miles.  City officials announced in April that they had chosen the Google-
EarthLink bid. 
Elinor Mills, Google forging ahead with Wi-Fi efforts, CNET  NEWS.COM,  June 7, 2006, 
http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1035_22-6081264.html. 
The excited stories continue.  See Belson, supra note 10 (referring to Sprint-Nextel’s 
planned $3 billion construction of a nationwide mobile WiMAX network); E-mail from paw-
lowski@telegeography.com to Professor Alfred E. Kahn, (Aug. 29, 2006) (listing more than 012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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And, referring to Vonage, 
An Internet phone pioneer, poised to go public, has rivals at its 
heels ....Vonage still leads, but others offer attractive cut rate deals.
79
CONCLUSION 
In all of this, it would be foolish to imply a greater certitude than I 
actually feel.  I suggest, however, that the following components of an 
integrated position are fully justified by recent experience:
80
 
A.  a strong belief in deregulation and the Schumpeterian competi-
tion that both prompts and is best served by it; 
B.  an equally firm belief in the importance of ensuring the avail-
ability of at least a third, independent broadband access op-
tion—presumably wireless—whether by application of the an-
titrust laws to intermodal mergers, opening up additional 
spectrum, subsidization or direct governmental provision—as 
a necessary protector of both subscribers and providers of con-
tent; 
C.  an unwillingness to jettison the essential facilities antitrust 
doctrine
81—recalling, in particular, that the dominance of in-
200 other such ventures in TeleGeography Update) (on file with author); Matt Richtel, A 
World Beyond Dial-Up, EarthLink Hurls Itself Into a Heady New Telecom Universe, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 18, 2006, at C1-2. 
  79. Ken Benson & Matt Rictel, An Internet Phone Pioneer, Poised to Go Public, Has 
Rivals at Its Heels, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2006, at C1. 
  80. There would be little point in my protesting that I had drafted these conclusions be-
fore receiving the exemplary Atkinson-Weiser article, since Professor Weiser has been my 
mentor in these matters during the last few years.  See Atkinson & Weiser, supra note 50. 
  81. REZA R. DIBADJ, RESCUING REGULATION 94-98 (forthcoming October 2006) (citing 
MCI’s successful suit against AT&T, MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 708 F.2d 1081 (7th 
Cir. 1983), which might well have provided injunctive relief sufficient to make dissolution 
unnecessary).  In brief, I think the decision in Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing 
Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985), was the right one and would have been so even if there had not 
been a previous history of the Aspen Corporation’s offering all-hills two-week tickets embrac-
ing the subsequently excluded Highlands. Aspen’s abandonment of that collaboration clearly 
was a major factor convincing the Supreme Court of its attempt to monopolize that market—a 
market in my view sufficiently defined by its own behavior. See also supra note 10 and ac-
companying text. 
Eleanor M. Fox provides powerful (and unwitting) support of my point here, in her with-
ering contradiction of the controlling Supreme Court opinion in Law Offices of Curtis V. 
Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. at 398, which dismissed the Aspen Skiing precedent on the ground that 
it hinged on the defendant’s abandonment of its previous willingness to deal with Highlands. 
See Elinor M. Fox, Is There Life In Aspen After Trinko?  The Silent Revolution of Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 153 (2005). 
I am compelled to confess, I am unable to offer a complete reconciliation of this view 
with my severe criticism of the FCC’s overly expansive definition of the network elements the 012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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cumbent telephone and cable companies in the broadband 
Internet access market traces back to their original respective 
monopoly franchises;
82 and 
D.  an especial alertness to the possibility of anticompetitive denial 
of access or vertical squeezing of independent suppliers of 
content.   
 
As to the former, I have already alluded to the FCC and CRTC or-
ders explicitly requiring ILECs to continue to permit competitors such as 
Vonage to offer VoIP over their broadband facilities.
83  As to the latter, 
the proponents of network neutrality may in effect be raising the familiar 
danger of a vertically-integrated monopolist using its control of the mo-
nopoly horizontal stratum to subject non-integrated rivals to one or an-
other form of squeeze.
84  But the condemnation of such exclusionary tac-
tics is part of historical antitrust doctrine, as is the corresponding 
requirement that suppliers of essential inputs comply with the dictates of 
competitive equity or (what comes to the same thing) the efficient com-
ponent pricing rule: both of these hold that, whatever the level of the 
charge for the essential input, the vertically integrated monopolist must 
incorporate that same charge, along with its own marginal cost of per-
forming the downstream function, in the prices it charges for the down-
stream product or service in the supply of which it competes with non-
integrated rivals.
85
ILECs were to be obliged to unbundle and the price it required them to charge and especially 
its prescribed TELRIC prices, except to observe that ensurance of competitive parity—the en-
forcement of which would clearly be the obligation of the agency or agencies vested with anti-
trust enforcement responsibilities—does not depend on the absolute level of the charge for the 
input: see the text immediately following. See Alfred E. Kahn et. al., The Telecommunications 
Act At Three Years: An Economic Evaluation of Its Implementation by The Federal Communi-
cations Commission, 11 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 319 (1999); see also infra note 81 and accom-
panying text. 
  82. This was the basis for my original defense of mandatory line sharing by the ILECs.  
See, e.g., Alfred E. Kahn,  Regulatory Politics as Usual (AEI-Brookings Joint Center, Policy 
Matters 03-3, Mar. 2003), available at http://www.aei.brookings.org/policy/page.php?id=127; 
Atkinson & Weiser, supra note 50, at 9-10 (citing the continuing employment in countries 
such as France and Japan of a “line-sharing model,” which facilitates the emergence of multi-
ple DSL competitors and the presence of which largely moots the issue of net neutrality “be-
cause consumers ... enjoy both a greater level of competition and more band width than in the 
United States.”). 
  83. See supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
  84. See Philip J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation Regulatory Strategy, 35 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 41, 66-85 (2004); see generally Farrell & Weiser, supra note 34, at 85. 
  85. See Telecom Corp. of New Zealand Ltd. v. Clear Commc’ns Ltd., [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 
385 (P.C.) (referring to my testimony on behalf of New Zealand Telecom in an antitrust pro-
ceeding before the High Court of New Zealand involving terms of interconnection with Clear, 
a competitive provider of local transport, April 27, 1992).  In the aforementioned testimony, I 
stressed the corollary of that proposition—namely, that determination of the absolute level of 
that charge was the proper function of the regulatory (as distinguished from the antitrust) au-012 KAHN-RERUN 10/11/2006  2:31:28 PM 
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In brief, the proponents of network neutrality are talking either non-
sense or the—prosaic—prose of competition and monopoly, regulation, 
deregulation, antitrust, market efficiency and failure, for all of which 
there are reasonable, non-ideological resolutions amply confirmed by 
experience in the last half century.  In any event, above all else, this pe-
riod of the most welcome turbulence, both technologically and institu-






thorities. See also William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Com-
petitors, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 171 (1994); Alfred E. Kahn & William E. Taylor, The Pricing of 
Inputs Sold to Competitors: A Comment, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 225 (1994); William J. Baumol 
& J. Gregory Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to Competitors: Rejoinder and Epilogue, 12 
YALE J. ON REG. 177 (1995). 
Timothy Tardiff reminds me that this is in effect the Areeda/Turner test, which I have 
demoted to non-essentiality as a test for predation.  The difference is that the inference of 
predatory intent—and effect—may be drawn from the course of behavior and events in the 
latter situation, whereas margins below marginal costs are the essence of a squeeze and can be 
demonstrated only by some form of Areeda/Turner comparison. 